The Overthrow of the Constitutional Order in Armenia: How Pashinyan’s Government Usurped the Judicial and Legislative Branches
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia places the principle of separation and balancing of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches at the foundation of the exercise of state power. Article 5 of the Constitution formulates the structure of government in precisely these terms, while Article 162 establishes that justice is administered only by courts, and any interference in the administration of justice is prohibited.
However, eight years after the 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” Armenia faces a reality in which the principle of separation of powers enshrined in Article 5 of the Constitution has gradually become a formality, while the real center of power has shifted around the Prime Minister and the parliamentary majority that unconditionally supports him. This process has not been limited to political declarations; it has had a clear institutional expression, from the blocking of courts to the reshaping of the Constitutional Court, from the expansion of disciplinary mechanisms against judges to the systematic restriction of the opposition’s parliamentary oversight mechanisms.
The Usurpation of the Judicial System: The Beginning Was Laid in 2019
Following the 2018 snap elections, the “My Step” Alliance led by Nikol Pashinyan received 88 of 132 mandates, a constitutional majority. This circumstance enabled the authorities to carry out broad constitutional changes without the consent of the opposition. The Venice Commission later recorded this political reality, noting that the new government had a constitutional majority in parliament.
However, the most difficult problem for the authorities was the judicial system.
In April 2019, Pashinyan stated at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that the revolution had taken place in the political system, but “a revolution has not taken place in the judicial system.” At the same time, he maintained that the government had abandoned the practice of directing the previously existing judicial system and aimed to ensure an independent judiciary.
On May 19, 2019, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called on citizens on his Facebook page to block the entrances and exits of all courts in the republic starting at 08:30 the following morning, preventing judges and employees from entering the buildings. The call came after a court changed Robert Kocharyan’s preventive measure. The following day, Pashinyan announced that “the process of having an independent judicial system in Armenia has begun and is now irreversible.”
In Pashinyan’s speech the following day, there was already talk of transitional justice, constitutional amendments if necessary, and the transformation of the judicial system. At the same time, the Prime Minister stated that he wanted not a “puppet,” but an independent judicial system.
This contradiction is the central knot of the subsequent processes: the authorities declared their commitment to judicial independence, while their opponents interpreted the same processes as an attempt to establish political control over the courts.
In July 2019, a number of political forces publicly stated that the authorities’ actions could lead to the “complete usurpation” of the judiciary. That statement singled out the blocking of courts, the issue of pressure on judges, influence over the Supreme Judicial Council, and the process of changing the composition of the Constitutional Court.
This event was assessed in a 2022 Council of Europe report as the beginning of a serious crisis in relations between the government and the judiciary. The blocking of the courts was not only direct pressure by the Prime Minister on the judiciary, but also created a precedent on the basis of which a comprehensive mechanism of political control over the judicial system was subsequently built.
Reshaping the Constitutional Court: Elimination of a Counterbalance to Power
In 2019–2020, the conflict moved to the Constitutional Court.
On June 22, 2020, the National Assembly, in an extraordinary session, adopted constitutional amendments that terminated the powers of three Constitutional Court judges and downgraded the status of Constitutional Court President Hrayr Tovmasyan, leaving him as a member of the court but without presidential powers. In a 2021 decision of the Constitutional Court, it was recorded that “the 2020 constitutional amendments were carried out under an urgent procedure, terminating the powers of one third of the total number of Constitutional Court judges.” The decision particularly emphasizes that “the 12-year term of office of Constitutional Court Judge Alvina Gyulumyan had not even expired under the 2020 constitutional amendments, which was also recorded by the Venice Commission, yet her powers were also terminated.”
In its opinion of June 22, 2020, the Venice Commission had warned about a violation of the principle of irremovability of judges and the danger posed to the independence of the Constitutional Court. On June 26, Venice Commission President Gianni Buquicchio, in a letter addressed to the President of the Constitutional Court, stated that the amendments “do not comply with the clear recommendations of the Venice Commission” and called for the “respect of the Constitution.”
The Constitutional Court decision also recorded that “with regard to the term of office of Constitutional Court President Hrayr Tovmasyan, the regulation providing for the immediate termination of his tenure was chosen, rather than shortening the term of his powers, which demonstrates the political objectives of the executive and legislative bodies.”
Here, it is important to turn not only to the Armenian press, but precisely to the documents of the Venice Commission.
Meanwhile, a subsequent report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recorded that on June 22, 2020, the National Assembly cancelled the holding of the referendum and simultaneously amended the transitional provisions in order to terminate the powers of three Constitutional Court judges and terminate the tenure of the President of the Constitutional Court. In September, parliament elected three new members.
This episode is of particular significance because it was not a matter of ordinary judicial appointments: the composition of the body that was also supposed to oversee the constitutionality of the legislative and executive branches was being changed.
Thus, the Constitutional Court, which was supposed to serve as the body overseeing the constitutionality of the three branches of government, was reshaped in 2020 under the direct influence of the incumbent political majority.
Nikol Pashinyan, in order to conceal the indisputable fact of subordinating the Constitutional Court to the executive branch, resorted to a cunning move.
In order to neutralize, or rather conceal, the accusation that the executive branch had established control over the Constitutional Court, Nikol Pashinyan made a subtle political calculation. On March 26, 2021, the newly composed Constitutional Court, within the framework of the Robert Kocharyan case, declared Article 300.1 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional. That decision is significant particularly because it does not allow the thesis that the Constitutional Court was subordinated to the authorities to be regarded as a one-sided truth. In support of Nikol Pashinyan’s latest initiative misleading Armenian society once again, the 2022 Council of Europe report particularly emphasizes that this decision by the newly composed Constitutional Court could be interpreted as evidence of the court’s independence, since it was made on a politically sensitive issue for the authorities.
It is difficult not to notice a strange pattern: when Nikol Pashinyan was gradually subordinating the judiciary to himself, the responses coming from Europe often looked more like political concealment than genuine condemnation. What was in fact unconstitutional interference was presented as “reform,” while European reports that recorded “risks” and “concerns” did not, in practice, lead to any serious consequence. A dangerous illusion was being created: the usurpation of the judicial system was viewed not as the overthrow of the constitutional order, but as a “justice reform” corresponding to European standards. And in this context, the 2022 Council of Europe report creates the illusion of the independence of the Constitutional Court, which, naturally, does not correspond to reality.
The Supreme Judicial Council and Disciplinary Mechanisms: A Tool for Intimidating Judges
In 2021, the Supreme Judicial Council examined 29 disciplinary proceedings, 18 of which had been initiated by the Ministry of Justice, 4 by the Corruption Prevention Commission, and 6 by the General Assembly of Judges. This in itself does not yet mean political pressure, but a 2023 report by the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly of Armenia states that the Supreme Judicial Council, under the leadership of Karen Andreasyan, terminated the powers of 33 judges in 2023, 10 of them as a result of disciplinary proceedings.
The report particularly emphasizes that the termination of the powers of a number of judges was in fact conditioned by their criticism of the Supreme Judicial Council’s practices. Judge Zaruhi Nakhshkaryan’s powers were terminated because, in a Facebook post, she had defended another judge, Anna Piloyan, whom the Supreme Judicial Council had removed from the judiciary. The powers of another judge, Davit Harutyunyan, were terminated on July 3, 2023, after he expressed doubts in an interview about the impartiality of the Supreme Judicial Council’s decisions to remove more than 20 judges from the system within half a year.
Here, a systemic problem arises: who directs and activates the mechanism of these disciplinary proceedings, who decides its politically sensitive cases, and can a judge be confident that his or her decision will not result in disciplinary prosecution?
In judicial documents concerning the disciplinary proceedings of the Supreme Judicial Council, it was recorded that “prior to July 3, 2023, proceedings concerning the alleged abuse of freedom of expression had been initiated against numerous judges, which were examined by the Supreme Judicial Council, and termination of powers took place.” The same document states that “after July 3, 2023, for more than a year no judge made a critical statement against the Ministry of Justice or the Supreme Judicial Council, nor raised any issue concerning the restriction of the independence of the judiciary.”
In 2022, a group of judges warned in a public statement that the Minister of Justice’s authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against judges could endanger judges’ functional immunity.
A 2024 resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recorded that the perception that disciplinary procedures against judges may be used to intimidate them or influence their decisions continues to be widespread in Armenia. The PACE called for ensuring the political neutrality of the Supreme Judicial Council and reviewing the disciplinary powers of the Ministry of Justice.
At the same time, the following must be recorded: in December 2024, the European Court of Human Rights, in the case “Suren Antonyan v. Armenia,” found that in that case the Supreme Judicial Council satisfied the requirements of an independent tribunal, and did not establish that the appointments of its non-judge members were politically influenced. In this context, we must once again state that European institutions legitimize Nikol Pashinyan’s unconstitutional actions through reports and decisions of authoritative institutions.
2023–2025: Removal of Judges and the Results of “Vetting”
In 2023, criticism surrounding the judicial system entered a new phase.
A report published by the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly of Armenia claimed that in 2023 the Supreme Judicial Council terminated the powers of 33 judges, 10 of them as a result of disciplinary proceedings. The same material also considered the election of the Supreme Judicial Council’s non-judge members by the parliamentary majority problematic.
On the other hand, the leadership of the Supreme Judicial Council itself stated at the end of 2023 that 200 of the 309 serving judges had been appointed after the 2018 revolution.
This figure is politically important.
If the majority of judges appointed after 2018 were already formed under the current authorities, then the dispute over the authorities’ influence is no longer limited to the question of replacing former judges. The question is how institutionally independent the new system is from the political authorities under which this personnel reshaping took place.
In 2023, Hraparak described this process in harsher terms, publishing the appointment of former Civil Contract MP Artur Davtyan as President of the Anti-Corruption Chamber of the Court of Cassation.
The Usurpation of the Legislative Branch: Parliament as an Appendage of the Executive
In the 2021 snap elections, the “Civil Contract” party received 71 mandates, again obtaining a constitutional majority. Of the 12 standing committees, the chairpersons of 9 were representatives of the ruling majority, 2 were from the “Armenia” faction, and 1 from “I Have Honor.”
The issue is not merely the numerical distribution of positions.
In a parliamentary system, the opposition must have real tools for overseeing the executive. And in 2021–2022, numerous conflicts arose precisely around these tools.
For example, the opposition had proposed an initiative to establish an investigative committee concerning the judicial system. Although the committee had been established by operation of law, the National Assembly did not approve the number of its members.
In another case, the opposition stated that the ruling majority had repeatedly failed to elect the opposition candidate for deputy chair of the Standing Committee on Defense and Security Affairs.
Here, the question of the internal balance of the legislative branch already arises.
If the parliamentary majority not only fully coincides with the government legislatively but also politically, parliament can become the legislative support of the executive branch rather than a body overseeing it.
An analytical article published by The Armenian Mirror-Spectator in 2025 states that “since August 2018, the Government of the Republic of Armenia has systematically removed all constitutional checks and balances.” The article emphasizes that “although the ruling party legally holds more than two-thirds of the votes in parliament, there is no longer democratic debate, since no committee chairmanships are reserved for opposition alliances.” The same source states that “outside parliament, the prime minister has reshaped the judiciary to conform to his program of action. He has removed from both the judiciary and the Constitutional Court all judges who do not share his policies or do not obey his instructions. In short, an independent judiciary no longer exists.”
On July 1, 2022, at the initiative of the “Civil Contract” faction, an extraordinary session was convened, and by a secret ballot with 66 votes in favor, it was decided to recall Ishkhan Saghatelyan, an MP from the “Armenia” faction, from the position of Deputy President of the National Assembly. The opposition did not nominate a new candidate.
2026: The Same Mechanism in the New Parliament
After the June 2026 elections, the “Civil Contract” party no longer has the previous two-thirds constitutional majority in the parliament that was formed.
This is a significant change: the executive branch continues to have a parliamentary majority, but broader agreement is required to reshape the constitutional system.
At the same time, already during the initial period of the new National Assembly’s work, Civil Contract initiated amendments to the constitutional law “Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly.” The amendment adopted on July 3, among other things, provided that if the opposition does not nominate a candidate for Deputy President of the National Assembly or chair of a standing committee within the relevant period, parliament may proceed to the next item on the agenda.
“Hraparak” connects this process with Civil Contract’s previous attempts to change parliamentary rules and recalls that after 2021, the law had been amended so that the right to nominate candidates for certain opposition positions was transferred to the largest faction.
As a result of this amendment, the National Assembly interrupted the process of forming the parliament: in particular, the chairs of two NA standing committees have not yet been elected, and it proceeded to the discussion of the Government’s program. Narek Karapetyan, head of the “Strong Armenia” faction, stated that they were preparing to apply to the Constitutional Court to restore the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly.
In practice, this amendment deprives the opposition of one of its most important parliamentary oversight mechanisms — leadership of committees.
The Prosecutor General’s Office as a Punitive Mechanism of the Authorities
Prosecutor General Anna Vardapetyan, who previously held the position of assistant to Prime Minister Pashinyan, continues to be viewed as serving the interests of the executive branch. The daily “Hraparak” writes: “Nikol Pashinyan’s former assistant, currently holding the position of Prosecutor General but never having truly moved beyond the status of the Prime Minister’s assistant, Anna Vardapetyan… came to parliament with the posture of a gendarme, did not answer a single question from journalists, and with her mouth shut, fled.”
The Overthrow of the Constitutional Order as a Systemic Process
The entirety of the facts from 2018–2026 allows us to record that what has taken place in Armenia is not a chain of separate institutional reforms, but a consistent process of the concentration of power, as a result of which the principle of separation of powers enshrined in Article 5 of the Constitution has been turned into a formality.
The judiciary has become an appendage of the executive as a result of the process that began with the blocking of courts in 2019 and was reinforced by the reshaping of the Constitutional Court in 2020. The disciplinary mechanisms of the Supreme Judicial Council have become a tool for intimidating judges and controlling their decisions. The legislative branch has become the legislative support of the executive, where the opposition is deprived of real oversight mechanisms.
Prosecutor General Anna Vardapetyan, the “Civil Contract” faction, and the judiciary serving the executive branch are complicit in the overthrow of the constitutional order. The real criterion of constitutional democracy is not the statements of the head of government. The criterion is whether a court can make a decision against the Prime Minister or his political team without fear of official or unofficial consequences, and whether parliament can oversee the government even when that government is formed by the political leader of the parliamentary majority. The facts of 2018–2026 show that the answer to these questions is negative.
What Liability Is Provided by the Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia for the Overthrow of the Constitutional Order
If we examine our investigation into the usurpation of the judicial and legislative branches from the perspective of legal liability, the picture becomes even more striking: Armenian criminal legislation directly provides for liability for the overthrow of the constitutional order, but during 2018–2026 this provision has not in practice been applied to representatives of the authorities.
Article 419. Usurpation of Power
- Seizing power by means of violence or the threat of violence, as well as assuming, through any other means not provided for by the Constitution, the powers of the President of the Republic, the National Assembly, the Government, or the Constitutional Court is punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years.
- Retaining power continuing to exercise the powers of the President of the Republic, a Member of Parliament, the Prime Minister, or a Minister after the expiration of those powers is punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years.
Article 420. Overthrow of the Constitutional Order
- Overthrowing the constitutional order actually terminating the operation of a norm provided for by Article 1, 2, 3, or 4, or Part 1 of Article 5 or Article 6, or Article 7 of the Constitution is punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years.
As a result, the penalties provided for the overthrow of the constitutional order — 10 to 15 years of imprisonment — remain practically unapplied to the authorities that, since 2018, have consistently weakened the system of checks and balances between the branches of government. This situation has arisen as a result of the inaction of the Prosecutor General, law-enforcement bodies, and the judiciary, who were in fact appointed by Nikol Pashinyan and are controlled by him.